David Cameron's negotiations on Europe

The British veto was far from game, set and match - as the Eurosceptics claim - but will the same tactics be used again? Our resident satirist Schadenfreude considers the evidence

The bright boys at Conservative Central Office, in the United Kingdom, came up some months ago with a win-win strategy for Europe. Whenever there is a new negotiation, the UK should agree only if it is also given the option of excluding itself. The catchphrase was "bartering the veto". Admittedly, the veto power is not omnipresent since the standard form of decision is now by majority vote - but issues could be brought together in package deals and other devices. For example, Britain could help to make up blocking minorities until it got its way - when it would accommodatingly assent.

Under this doctrine, the UK could remain "in" for what suited it, but "out" whenever it did not find a new measure consistent with its tradition, culture, social structures and established policy. The stratagem had the further advantage of providing relief from the "referendum brake" built in in 2011, under which any new transfer of powers to the European Union provokes a British plebiscite. Even better, the agreement to allow something new - not to veto - could be conditional upon getting something back, like escaping from some existing rule which does not (now) suit them. Truly, a master stroke of negotiation.

If this innovative policy had been in vogue sooner, much could have been achieved. Britain could have cut the cost of membership by obtaining a rebate; excluded the UK from passport-free travel; opted out of the Maastricht social contract; exempted the country from whatever was being done in the field of justice and home affairs, unless the UK wanted to join in; obtained a derogation from adopting the euro; made the charter of fundamental freedoms subject to the supremacy of national law.

Unfortunately, when the plan was given its first practical airing in December it was not used quite as intended. The British Prime Minister played the veto card by telling the others that they could not have a treaty to establish a fiscal union. But as well as using this stance as negotiating currency, he called for a unilateral concession – unanimity to replace majority voting for new financial services regulation. He then doubled his hand by declaring that the others could not use the EU to draw up their treaty establishing a stability union - although, he later generously withdrew this prohibition.

So there will be a treaty, which the UK will not be asked to ratify, and financial regulation - under the existing treaty - will power ahead. Perhaps it was not quite game, set and match. But it was a try out, from which lessons can be learned. There will be another opportunity if, as is being mooted, the new agreement of 20+ signatories involves amendment of the Lisbon Treaty. Watch this space.