Is France 'comfortable' as Germany's junior partner?

Popular discourse suggests France is haunted by its decline and Germany's power but in reality a united Europe is the only way to make its voice heard

Given the attention paid to Germany's role in the euro crisis since 2008, and the impression that important European Union decisions regarding the rescue of banks as well as the governments of Ireland, Greece, Italy, and so on were made according to Berlin's preferences, French leadership in Europe has been increasingly put into question. In France itself, the prospect of Paris playing junior partner to a reinvigorated and much more self-confident Berlin, seems almost an obsession with French elites.

Across party lines, they have been torn between coming to terms with the increasing assertiveness of their closest partner in European and global affairs, and the temptation of Gaullist grandstanding. This dilemma goes back to German reunification and was patent in moments of high uncertainty, for example Mitterrand's prevaricating over whether Paris should support German reunification in 1989-90, and during the referendum campaign on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Difficult negotiations over the 2001 Nice Treaty could be regarded as a major watershed in French-German power relations within the EU. Chirac's acceptance of the German demand to have their share of seats in the European Parliament significantly increased in order to reflect their demographic weight was described by the long-standing French MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges as a "European divorce" and the "end of a privileged relationship between the two countries".

Do these events, put together, indicate a France that is fading into irrelevance? It is true that within the Franco-German couple since the beginning of the eurozone crisis, as William Paterson argues, "German preferences prevailed in a much more dominant way than in the past". Admittedly tempting, then, to agree with Paterson that the Franco-German relationship is more important to France than to Germany, "where they view being seen as being close to Germany as a power resource" and where they start to resemble the United Kingdom in its self-suggested special relationship with the United States. But a more realistic approach to the inevitability of German economic dominance seems to prevail in French political discourse since the economic and financial crisis broke in 2008. Germany is neither powerful enough to assume a truly hegemonic position, nor small enough to escape leadership responsibilities; it is Europe's 'reluctant hegemon'. In order for its own policy preferences to succeed, Germany needs a France that appears strong, and which remains open to compromise and joint leadership. This article argues that despite the headlines, this 'power shift anxiety' is receding.

First, French leadership and participation have for decades been a given, a sine qua non in European integration; the project accepted as a sophisticated solution to the 'German problem' – keeping Germany down, rehabilitating, or integrating a potential hegemon. The European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951, was envisioned and designed by Jean Monnet, the Frenchman and first president of the ECSC's High Authority, predecessor of the European Commission. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, yet another founding father of Europe, had lent critical political support to Monnet. Their organisational talents and commitment to the ideal of incremental economic integration serving a long-term goal of political union – now referred to as the Monnet Method - were instrumental in establishing the European Communities via the Treaties of Rome in 1957.

Another French statesman, Jacques Delors, re-launched in the 1980s the European project from 'Eurosclerosis', a doom-and-gloom period of low growth. Today Delors is considered the epitome of the ideal commission president: a clever broker of ideas, respected by the heads of national governments and driving a European agenda without undermining their egos. Monnet, Schuman and Delors would be considered 'thought leaders' today, outstanding individuals who draw authority from the power of a deeply felt idea.

When France desisted, European integration spluttered. During the empty chair crisis of 1965-66, De Gaulle threatened to withdraw France from the EEC, insisting on national sovereignty against more muscular integration as advocated by commission president Walter Hallstein. When German reunification threatened to undermine the bases of the European project, President Mitterrand responded with contradictory and bizarre procrastinations and manoeuvres in 1989-90; the nail-biting French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was dominated by an almost surreal debate about Germany; the 2001 intergovernmental conference in Nice failed to produce a new vision on Europe; and the nail in the coffin of Europe's Constitutional Treaty was hammered by the French people's 'non' vote in the spring referendum of 2005.

Second, one should be wary of media bias. Typical understandings and commonly held beliefs about France and the French state's role in international relations tend to be almost exclusively informed by Anglo-American perceptions about the decline of French power. Most print media in the world buy their stories from Anglophone news agencies like Reuters and AP. And even Asian newspapers, when they publish in English, typically buy their stories from these news agencies and are heavily informed by the likes of The New York Times, the International Herald Tribune, The Washington Post, the Financial Times, The Economist, not to mention CNN, Bloomberg and the BBC which monopolise the hotel lobby and airport lounge screens around the globe.

These media outlets inform the world's political, cultural and business elite and their vision of international affairs trickles down into mainstream thought. The differences in interpretation are often striking: anybody closely following the G20 summits in London in 2009 or Nice in 2011 simultaneously on Anglo-American and European networks would be hard pressed to tell that the same event was being reported.

Third, Germany is by no means prepared or eager to take leadership on European integration. From the very beginning the EU was based on the principle of parity between France and Germany. Germany's economic power was counter-balanced by its own desire to remain a political dwarf to avoid re-arousing old suspicions among partners and neighbours. It quickly became conventional wisdom in Europe that even if an agreement between France and Germany was insufficient to impose a fait accompli on their partners, progress in European integration was only possible if the two worked hand-in-hand.

At the same time, France – from de Gaulle to Mitterrand – took its political leadership, backed by its nuclear power status and permanent membership in the United Nation Security Council, as its unquestioned right. Many today note how Kohl's successors, Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel, promote German interests with a stronger assertiveness than previous chancellors, putting the old parity principle more and more into question. But recent discourse in the run-up to the French presidential elections in May 2012, suggest that in France itself, this power shift anxiety is receding. In its place is a more relaxed approach to the inevitability of German economic dominance. The debates following Nicolas Sarkozy's 1 December 1 2011 speech in Toulon – which launched his re-election bid – are telling. Instead of the expected Gaullist grandstanding, Sarkozy called for the sharing of sovereignty as a pillar of European integration.

Another new key word in France's European policy is convergence – both understood as a step towards the harmonisation of economic and fiscal policies across the eurozone and as an objective in France's approach to a dominant Germany. But even more symptomatic of the change of attitude towards Germany than the president's speech itself, are the reactions to it. Socialist Party attempts to portray Sarkozy as a vassal subservient to Merkel's will backfired spectacularly. The use of historically laden analogies – such as Martine Aubry's "capitulate to the Germans", Arnaud Montebourg's "Bismarck-style policies" or Jean-Marie Le Guen's "like Daladier at Munich" referring to the notorious 1938 appeasement meeting – found resonance only at the extreme fringes of the political spectrum. They invited harsh criticisms from mainstream public opinion. While French politicians may criticise Merkel's European policy, any displays of anti-German sentiments or an inferiority complex risk being swiftly and publicly censured.

France can feel comfortable about its junior position in joint European leadership. While Anglo-American mainstream discourse suggests that France is permanently haunted by the decline of its global political, cultural and linguistic influence, the French themselves have well understood that globalisation inevitably leads to a decline of Western dominance. The only way their nation's voice may still be heard and listened to in the 21st century, is through an influential and possibly united Europe. And within this Europe, it is preferable to share leadership with a stronger neighbour than to sideline or isolate oneself through unrealistic pretensions.

Dr Reuben Wong is assistant political science professor at the National University of Singapore and an associate fellow at the EU Centre Singapore. Dr Albrecht Sonntag is chairman of the Centre for European Integration at the ESSCA School of Management