Reforming Europe's military forces in an economic crisis
by David Galbreath
20 September 2011
Europe spends half what it did on defence at the end of the Cold War and the financial crisis has made the cost issue even more acute - writes Dr David Galbreath
Europe has witnessed a significant change in the way that it structures and deploys its military at home and abroad. The first wave of military reform came with the end of the Cold War. While western European states were adjusting to a life beyond a Soviet threat, eastern European states were bringing their militaries under the aegis of civilian command and governance. The result was an array of militaries that by and large looked as they did during the Cold War, but they were often smaller and more reliant on the trickle-down effect of Anglo-American technological developments. With the Cold War over, no European state decided to go the way of Iceland and Costa Rica and forego a military altogether. Rather, European militaries were quickly put into service in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union.
Yet, the structural changes in the international system forced many politicians to seek a review of their military in terms of fit and cost. Fitness is not an easy assessment as it begs the question: fit for what? In the European case, this meant for most states being able participate in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation operations. The cost of militaries, though, is undeniably a key factor in shaping the structure and strategy of a national military. Europe currently spends slightly more than half what it did at the end of the Cold War. The global financial crisis has made the issue of cost even more acute. In a shrinking economy, governments have far less tax on which to spend on public services such as defence.
What link is there between the reducing resources available and the changing nature of military strategy in Europe? Since the end of the Cold War and the new generation of information technology, the distance is growing not just in hardware - but in strategy itself. This has led some American commentators to ask: in the future - will the United States be able, even, to cooperate on the battlefield with its European allies. This change in military strategy, started by Nazi Germany in the blitzkrieg, has come to be known as "revolution in military affairs" or RMA, network-centric rather than platform-centric and, more generally, as flexibility through context-specific operations. America has led the changes in military strategy, although the cost and debates in the US have not been completed or wholly won by either side – as in: "to IT or not to IT?" Where does this leave Europe?
Does Europe have the ability to change? And, if so, what is driving the changes: strategy or resources? If strategy is key, we should see several alterations. We should see a shift from platform centric to network centric defence planning. We should see the prioritisation or expeditionary forces, which embody the essence of manoeuvre and deep penetration. In response, we should see a reduction in regular troops with armies being the worst hit. Overall, flexibility and mobility would become the priority. Alternatively, if resources are key, we should see an overall budget reduction across the board. We should see network-centric systems abandoned. Naturally, we would also see troop numbers reduced. Yet, we should see navies and air forces the worst hit, since they make up the big money projects. Finally, we should see a reduction in the numbers of operations. Can we afford another intervention?
When we look across European military reforms, we can see that only the British and the French have taken the network-centric approach seriously. Both countries have initiated IT systems that would service context-specific operations. The British, in particular, have singled out the army for reductions. Both countries have increased the expeditionary force levels – although, the French Legions have maintained such a force throughout the post-colonial period. At the same time, we see that there is growing distance between the UK and France on one hand and the rest of Europe on the other. German and Italian reforms, for different reasons, are producing little results in terms of military reform.
The conflict in Afghanistan, especially, not to mention the Chancellor Angela Merkel's remarkable disinterest in foreign policy makes reform in Germany difficult - even at the best of times. While changes in military strategy appear to have a significant impact on force structures and asset investments, the financial crisis has the potential to further differentiate the basic operations systems of the US and its European allies. And woe the European leaders that fail to recognise the growing strategic change.
Dr David Galbreath is senior lecturer at the University of Bath and editor-in-chief of the European Security journal
Europe has witnessed a significant change in the way that it structures and deploys its military at home and abroad. The first wave of military reform came with the end of the Cold War. While western European states were adjusting to a life beyond a Soviet threat, eastern European states were bringing their militaries under the aegis of civilian command and governance. The result was an array of militaries that by and large looked as they did during the Cold War, but they were often smaller and more reliant on the trickle-down effect of Anglo-American technological developments. With the Cold War over, no European state decided to go the way of Iceland and Costa Rica and forego a military altogether. Rather, European militaries were quickly put into service in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union.
Yet, the structural changes in the international system forced many politicians to seek a review of their military in terms of fit and cost. Fitness is not an easy assessment as it begs the question: fit for what? In the European case, this meant for most states being able participate in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation operations. The cost of militaries, though, is undeniably a key factor in shaping the structure and strategy of a national military. Europe currently spends slightly more than half what it did at the end of the Cold War. The global financial crisis has made the issue of cost even more acute. In a shrinking economy, governments have far less tax on which to spend on public services such as defence.
What link is there between the reducing resources available and the changing nature of military strategy in Europe? Since the end of the Cold War and the new generation of information technology, the distance is growing not just in hardware - but in strategy itself. This has led some American commentators to ask: in the future - will the United States be able, even, to cooperate on the battlefield with its European allies. This change in military strategy, started by Nazi Germany in the blitzkrieg, has come to be known as "revolution in military affairs" or RMA, network-centric rather than platform-centric and, more generally, as flexibility through context-specific operations. America has led the changes in military strategy, although the cost and debates in the US have not been completed or wholly won by either side – as in: "to IT or not to IT?" Where does this leave Europe?
Does Europe have the ability to change? And, if so, what is driving the changes: strategy or resources? If strategy is key, we should see several alterations. We should see a shift from platform centric to network centric defence planning. We should see the prioritisation or expeditionary forces, which embody the essence of manoeuvre and deep penetration. In response, we should see a reduction in regular troops with armies being the worst hit. Overall, flexibility and mobility would become the priority. Alternatively, if resources are key, we should see an overall budget reduction across the board. We should see network-centric systems abandoned. Naturally, we would also see troop numbers reduced. Yet, we should see navies and air forces the worst hit, since they make up the big money projects. Finally, we should see a reduction in the numbers of operations. Can we afford another intervention?
When we look across European military reforms, we can see that only the British and the French have taken the network-centric approach seriously. Both countries have initiated IT systems that would service context-specific operations. The British, in particular, have singled out the army for reductions. Both countries have increased the expeditionary force levels – although, the French Legions have maintained such a force throughout the post-colonial period. At the same time, we see that there is growing distance between the UK and France on one hand and the rest of Europe on the other. German and Italian reforms, for different reasons, are producing little results in terms of military reform.
The conflict in Afghanistan, especially, not to mention the Chancellor Angela Merkel's remarkable disinterest in foreign policy makes reform in Germany difficult - even at the best of times. While changes in military strategy appear to have a significant impact on force structures and asset investments, the financial crisis has the potential to further differentiate the basic operations systems of the US and its European allies. And woe the European leaders that fail to recognise the growing strategic change.
Dr David Galbreath is senior lecturer at the University of Bath and editor-in-chief of the European Security journal
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