Are the Franco-British defence treaties bad for NATO?

For the UK and France to remain military powers with a global outreach, 'share or lose' has become the new mantra – but what now for NATO?

On November 2, 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed a joint declaration on security and defence. The two historic treaties agreed on that day laid out a framework for cooperation between the two countries and introduced no less than 17 joint programmes to increase interoperability between their respective armed forces and industries. This renewed partnership is rooted in years of strategic rapprochement as well as immediate economic necessity. For the UK and France to retain sufficient defence capabilities to allow them to remain military powers with global outreach and influence - it had, indeed, become a "share or lose" matter in an era of budget austerity.

Cooperation made strategic and economic sense for both countries, not least because they share many characteristics. The only two nations in Europe with nuclear weapon status and a seat at the United Nations security council, they are both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union. Together, they account for 45 per cent of the EU's total defence and security budget, 55 per cent of its operational forces and some 75 per cent of its military and technology spending. Additionally, the UK and France face similar threats and challenges - including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, terrorism, cyber attacks, and maritime and space security. In the joint declaration, signed last November at Lancaster House, the leaders of the two countries even stated that they "do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either nation could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened". The close relationship between Cameron and Sarkozy provided a strong driver for bilateral political rapprochement. Under their influence, France rejoined the NATO military command in 2009, while the UK has reassessed its special relationship with the US - after years of struggle in Afghanistan and Iraq and a subsequent reorientation of American strategic focus away from Europe.

Nevertheless, strategic differences remain. France has retained a protectionist attitude towards its defence industry - which is, in large part, owned by the state - in line with the country's tradition of Colbertian economic policies. France's rationale is that defence markets would not exist without states, given the crucial importance of sovereignty in defence policies. The UK has opted for a different approach, traditionally considering that the defence market does not differ greatly from other markets and should, therefore, be free. While France's industrial relations are more oriented towards Europe, British industries retain strong ties with the US market. For, BAE Systems is now for the most part based in America - where it generated more than half of its revenues in 2009. Most notably, thanks to the Typhoon and F35 programmes. Additionally, the UK and France disagree over the role that private security and military companies should play in international crisis management. France being quite reluctant to use privately employed personnel on the ground.

Moreover, while both countries aspire to use diplomatic and military tools for international influence, their strategies have been fundamentally different since the end of the Second World War. London has chosen to remain a strong, even at times unconditional partner to the US, while Paris has sought to follow a more Euro-focused path. Britain has opted for high-intensity missions and forces, interoperable with the US, while France has relied more heavily on strategic assets - more independent nuclear and intelligence policies, in particular. It has aspired to create a strong European security and defence architecture that would be largely autonomous from Washington.

What does the joint declaration mean for NATO? Official reactions in Brussels were supportive. In the immediate aftermath of the Lancaster House Summit, NATO spokesman James Appathurai stated that "at a time when we need the most value for what we spend on defence, increased cooperation like this makes all the more sense". A few weeks later, at a summit in Lisbon, NATO leaders announced: "We welcome the outcome of the France-UK summit. We believe that such bilateral reinforcements of European capabilities will contribute to NATO's overall capabilities." More recently, NATO assistant secretary general for public diplomacy Jean-Francois Bureau noted that it "offers a real opportunity that is not to be missed" and was "one of the rare pieces of good news to come out from the alliance's European side". Behind the scenes, some have expressed doubts about where the agreement might lead.

The recent crisis in Libya has provided an illustration of the current and future opportunities and challenges for the alliance resulting from a renewed Franco-British partnership. On the one hand, the UK and France have proved to be the only European forces with sufficient military power, political will and operational commitment to provide leadership during international crisis management missions. In particular, without the strong political push from Sarkozy and Cameron, the UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 - would have been very difficult to attain. On the other hand, some tensions appeared at the onset of the conflict over the aims of the mission, communications on the ground and, most notably, command and control. It was reported that France was in favour of a Franco-British command taking over from the initial American military leadership, but the UK insisted that NATO should be in charge of the next phase. France has traditionally taken an independent stance within NATO, but the key issue is that the UK lacks the confidence to intervene in a mission where the US is not significantly involved.

Some lessons can be drawn from the ongoing Libyan crisis. France and the UK can act as a strong political driver, but need more partners to achieve military success on the ground. For example, they were responsible for only half of the first 100 air strikes, with the US reluctantly taking charge of the other half. The likelihood of American disengagement from Europe and North Africa, which Europeans have expected – and, in some cases feared - since the end of the Cold War has never been higher. The huge national debt – more than $14 trillion - the country is now facing has become, to use Admiral Mike Mullen's words, the single biggest threat to national security, and may require the US to think twice before launching costly military interventions; especially, in Europe's backyard.

This raises the question of how strong a crisis management force NATO would be without the US. If the UK and France need other European military partners with the defence capabilities and political will to use them, who should they turn to? Countries like Germany and Italy - at least, initially - have proved rather reluctant to intervene. Most have also expressed suspicions about the Franco-British treaties, claiming that the partnership should remain open to other potential members. While some have argued that the Libyan crisis has marked the death of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, it could actually signify a real turning point for NATO. Franco-British cooperation is not a disease that could threaten the alliance's life, but rather a symptom of profound harm within the organisation – namely, the US disengagement. Only time will tell whether the UK, France and others will help NATO to survive or turn to alternatives.

Benoit Gomis is an international security analyst at the Chatham House think-tank, in the UK. This article first appeared on defencemanagement.com, a sister title of PublicServiceEurope.com Are the Franco-British defence treaties bad for NATO?